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Beyond Baehr:
Strengthening The Definition of Marriage
Katherine Shaw Spaht"

Words strain,
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden,
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish,
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place,
Will not stay still. Shrieking voices
Scolding, mocking, or merely chattering,
Always assail them.

-from T.S. Eliot, Burnt Norton,
FOUR QUARTETS

I. INTRODUCTION
It is one of the curiosities of the strange age in which we live that the
word "marriage" has lost much of its cultural meaning. The "shrieking
voices" of America's most influential opinion-shapers, which relentlessly

* Copyright © !998 by Katherine Shaw Spaht. Jules F. and Frances L. Landry Professor
of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. This text was originally delivered in November, 1997
at Law and the Politics of Marriage: Loving v. Virginia After Thirty Years, at the Catholic
University of America, co-sponsored by the Columbus School of Law, Howard University School
of Law, and the J. Reuben Clark School of Law at Brigham Young University. Additionally, the
author drafted Louisiana's Covenant Marriage legislation.
The author wishes to express her gratitude to her husband of twenty-six years, Paul H. Spaht,
with whom she is now married in a "Covenant Marriage" for his patience and support throughout
the 1997 legislative session and its aftermath; to Representative Tony Perkins, the representative who
authored the "Covenant Marriage" legislation and selected it from among many options a~ the most
appropriate way to change divorce law; to Mr. Marshall Shaw, her brother and best friend who
offered advice and editing assistance; to Ms. Candace Cenac, her research assistant who compiled
two notebooks of state statutes and judicial opinions passed and rendered since Baehr v. Miike for
the conference in Washington, D.C. and who prepared a memorandum on the effects of divorce on
children that helped convince Louisiana legislators that changes had to be made in divorce law; to
Mrs. Madeline Babin, who worked tirelessly to produce the final copy of the outline for the
conference and this manuscript; and lastly, to the three law schools who sponsored the conference
on marriage-Catholic University, Howard University, and Brigham Young University.
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assail the traditional meaning of marriage, have had their effect in legal
arenas as well as in the broader culture. The culture wars of the late twentieth century thus find a focus in the intensifying struggle over how to define the word "marriage" as a legal term of art.
Past generations did not necessarily require a legally binding definition
of marriage, for people who are instructed in the tenets of Christian morality have an instinctive understanding of what the word means. The received model of Christian marriage is grounded in universal truths, natural
orders, 1 and enduring moral boundaries. 2 As a unique institution, Christian
marriage has traditionally been defined by three elements: 1) sexual complementarity, the "ordering" purpose of which is procreation; 2)mutual
faithfulness; and 3) "the special bond of permanence conferred by God as
a 'sacrament,' a gift of grace."3
The modem meaning of the word "marriage," understood as a legal
term of art, began to evolve away from this religiously grounded definition
concurrently with the de-Christianization of the broader American culture.
This evolution in meaning accelerated at the end of the 1960s, as federal
judges began more actively to reshape the law of the family to accord with
their own secularized ideals. It has now culminated in the current debate
over same-sex marriage, which is frequently dominated by popular culture's "shrieking voices."
The evolution of the definition of marriage manifested in judicial opinions began with the United States Supreme Court's 1967 opinion in Loving v. Virginia 4 and culminated in Baehr v. Miike, 5 a 1993 decision of the
Hawaii Supreme Court. In Loving v. Virginia marriage begins as a traditionally understood relationship and progressively evolves into a vehicle
for publicly expressed personal fulfillment. No doubt the evolution of the
definition of marriage 6 partially influenced the discovery of a constitutional right to intimate association of a lesbian couple recently recognized

I. Professor Coolidge in his article in South Texas Law Review referred to marriage as a
sexually-defined "community" known to man through reason and conscience (universal principles).
The traditional model of "marriage" merely reflected man's attempt to implement the universal
principles in the form of human law. David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miike
and the Meaning of Marriage, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. I, 33, 40 (1997).
2. Jd. at 31.
3. Id.
4. 388 U.S. I (1967).
5. 852 P.2d 44(1993).
6. See Jonathan Rauch, For Better or Worse? Behind the Movement for Gay Marriage Lies
a Deeper Issue: What is Marriage for, and Why is it in Trouble? THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 6, 1996,
at 18.
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in Shahar v. Bowers/ a decision ultimately vacated by a three-judge panel,
then reversed by an en bane panel of the United States Court of Appeal.
Reacting to the specter of Baehr's recognition of same-sex marriage,
we "The People" through our state and federal representatives responded
overwhelmingly and almost immediately by defining "marriage" in statutory terms as a union between one man and one woman. 8 Yet, we "The
People" ourselves bear responsibility for diminishing the definitional
model of marriage and progressively diluting its meaning. Marriage in judicial opinions evolved from an institution into a personal right, an evolution condoned by "The People" who welcomed a far less restrictive and
binding personal arrangement, freeing the individual from the oppression
of a sacred relationship. Thus, do we "The People" indignantly reap what
we sow, all the while ignorant that we "The People" bear the responsibility.
To strengthen the definition of marriage as a unique institution and to
restore its meaning, we "The People" must not only assure that marriage
contains the defining element of sexual complementarity represented by
the union of a man and a woman, but also that it contains the elements of
mutual faithfulness, and more importantly, "the special bond of permanence."9 Despite the fact that the traditional model of marriage has "retained a strong hold on the American cultural and legal imagination," 10 we
"The People" abandoned marriage's "special bond of permanence" first by
permitting increasingly easier divorce. To strengthen the definition of marriage it is essential that we "The People" enact laws that make divorce
more difficult. For it is only by promoting the defining element of marriage, permanence-which represents the ultimate self-sacrifice-that we
"The People" can silence the "shrieking voices" that continue to assail the
institution of marriage, as traditionally understood.
This paper will examine the crisis concerning the definition of marriage and its effect on marriage as a social institution in three steps. First, it
will trace the evolution of the legal definition of marriage through the judicial opinions of the past thirty or so years. Second, it will examine the response of we "The People" to the crisis facing marriage as an institution.
Third, it will propose a solution to the crisis through the use of "Covenant
Marriage" which will act to restore permanence to marriage thereby returning it to its status as a social institution.

7. 70 F.3d 1218 (lith Cir. 1995), vacated, reh'g en bane granted, 78 F.3d 499 (lith Cir.
1996) (upholding vacated opinion), reh'g denied, 120 F/3d 2ll (1997), rev'd, ll4 F.3d 1097 (llth
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, _U.S._ (No. 97-751, Jan. 12, 1998).
8. See infra notes 46-50.
9. Coolidge, supra note I, at 31.
10. /d. at 33.
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE DEFINITION OF MARRIAGE IN JUDICIAL
DECISIONS

In Loving v. Virginian the recognition of the right to marry as fundamental entailed a description of marriage as one of the" 'basic civil rights
of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival." 12 Later in the
opinion, the court describes the freedom to marry as "one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." 13 A
right described as essential to the existence and survival of mankind and
essential to the orderly 14 pursuit of happiness is entirely consistent with the
traditional model of marriage. However, the focus on marriage as a personal right in the description in Loving transforms an institution of society
into a personal right of the individual seeking to marry which allows them
to be free of certain governmental restrictions on that right.
Considered as an institution, rather than merely a personal right, the
definition of marriage focuses on the unit of husband and wife, committed
to each other and forming the foundation of another institution, the family,
which is essential for the training of children "to participate in the religious, civil and political life of society." 15 Described as a personal right
essential to the pursuit of happiness, however, the emphasis shifts to the
individual and why he or she desires to marry. Thus, language probably
not intended to affect drastically the traditional model of marriage becomes
the seed for the description almost twenty years later in Turner v. Saflei 6
of the important attributes of marriage.
The United States Supreme Court, in Turner, decided that for incarcerated inmates certain important attributes of marriage remain, and those
attributes are sufficient to create a constitutionally protected marital relationship "in the prison context." 17 The attributes described as sufficient to
constitute the core of the "right to marry" include: (1) "expressions of
emotional support and public commitment," 18 a form of personal dedication; (2) "an exercise of religious faith," 19 giving the marriage a spiritual
dimension; (3) "the expectation that marriage will be fully consum-

II. 388 U.S. I.
12. /d. at 12 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)) (emphasis added).
13. /d. (emphasis added).
14. Use of the word "orderly" suggests that pursuit of happiness requires modification by an
adjective understood to qualifY the individual pursuit of happiness by the imposition of constrictions
in the natural order of things (natural law).
15. Coolidge, supra note I, at 31.
16. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
17. /d. at 96.
18. /d. at 95.
19. /d. at 96.
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mated"; 20 and (4) "the receipt of government benefits." 21 Obviously, such a
conception of marriage, or the marital relationship is predicated on the perspective of the individual person who seeks to achieve personal happiness
from marriage. What remains of the traditional model of marriage is a hint
of sexual complementarity conveyed by the word "consummated," but
without reference to the ordering purpose of procreation. 22
The description of a marital relationship in Turner almost twenty years
after Loving suggests much had happened in American society in the intervening years to reduce marriage to a personal right to be pursued by the
individual with the intention of accomplishing, at least as articulated, selfish purposesY By comparison, the new conception of marriage articulated
in Turner bears little resemblance to the traditional model of marriage as a
unique institution defined by: sexual complementarity for the purpose of
procreation; mutual faithfulness; and the special bond of permanence conferred by God as a "sacrament. " 24 The attributes of marriage described in
the Turner case could be ascribed to a contract of donation to a church for
the purpose of establishing a counseling center in your name. The evolution in meaning of marriage occurred despite the general warning not to
expand constitutional rights by redefining them, a warning that came from
the same United States Supreme Court in the same year Turner was decided.25

20.

/d.

21.
22.

/d.
Coolidge, supra note 1, at 31; See also Rick Duncan, Homosexual Marriage and the Myth
of Tolerance: Is Cardinal O'Connor a "Homophobe"? 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'Y
587 (1996); Richard F. Duncan, Wigstock and the Kulturkampf Supreme Court Storytelling, The
Culture War, and Romer v. Evans, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 345 (1997); Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical
Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1 (1996).
23. See Christopher Wolfe, 171e Marriage of Your Choice, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 1995, at 37-38.
Wolfe also wrote:

No-fault divorce legislation was, from one perspective, merely part of a larger
cultural change that expanded personal autonomy, not merely in maniage laws, but in the
area of sexuality generally (and more broadly as well). It is surely not the sole cause of
declining family stability."
On the other hand, even if it is, to a considerable extent, an epiphenomenon of
deeper cultural changes, once ensconced in the law, divorce becomes part of the "moral
ecology'" of our culture and shapes the attitudes and expectations of many citizens about
marriage.
/d.

24.
25.

See Coolidge, supra note I, at 31.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-5 (1986). The Court stated:

Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover new
fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause . . . .
. . . There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach of
those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category, or rights deemed to be
fundamental.
/d.
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The evolving social conception of marriage articulated in United
States Supreme Court opinions from an institution to the individual's right
to pursue personal happiness 26 led not illogically seven years later in Baehr
v. Miike 21 to a challenge by persons denied such a personal right28 by state
statute. State statutes and judicial opinions, 29 by virtue of the universal acceptance of the traditional understanding of the meaning of marriage, obviously denied such a personal right to persons of the same sex just as others
are also denied the right to marry because they fall outside the traditional
understanding of the meaning of marriage. 30 Even though Baehr v. Miike 31
ultimately concluded that the right was not "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if it were sac-

Interestingly, the Bowers case had occasion to comment on marriage: "No connection between
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been
demonstrated, either by the Court of Appeals or by respondent." /d. at 191; See Richard F. Duncan,
The Narrow and Shallow Bit of Romer and the Eminent Rationality of Dual-Gender Marriage: A
(Partial) Response to Professor Koppelman, 6 WM & MARY BILL OF RTS J. 147 (1997) (concluding
that the Bowers case is unaffected by Romer v. Evans, I 16 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)).
Naturaiiy, the Bowers case has been the target of many scholarly critiques, especially as the
debate about same-sex marriage has intensified. Nonetheless, the same caution about discovery of
new fundamental rights, or the redefining of such rights, was repeated three years later in Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. IIO (1989). According to the Court, identifying a fundamental right. such
as marriage, requires identifying "the most specific level at which [there is] a relevant tradition
protecting the asserted right .... " /d. at 127-28, n.6.
26. "Rights talk" is eloquently explored in Mary Ann Glendon, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991).
27. 852 P.2d 44.
28. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV.
1419, 1427-28 (1993), for a sympathetic view of the extension of "marriage" to same-sex couples.
Professor Eskridge's article is simply one example among many such articles. For a contrary view,
see, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 312 (1992); see also Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential
Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 601.
America's concentration on rights rather than responsibilities in their legal conversations is
discussed in GLENDON, supra note 26.
29. See infra notes 46-50; Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235, 65 USLW 2399 (Hawaii Cir.Ct.
Dec.3, 1996).
30. For example polygamy is prohibited in aU states so that a person who is already married
cannot marry another. In addition, those related by blood, and in some cases adoption, within certain
degrees, which vary from state to state, are prohibited from marrying.
31. 852 P.2d 44. The Hawaii Supreme Court vacated the lower court's order and remanded
the case for a decision not inconsistent with their opinion. Although the Hawaii Supreme Court
refused to extend the right of privacy to protect same-sex couples in their right to marry, the Court
did hold that sex is a "suspect category" for purposes of equal protection analysis under Article I,
§ 5 of the Hawaii Constitution. The majority further held that HRS 572- I was subject to "strict
scrutiny" and presumed unconstitutional unless the State of Hawaii could show that there were
compelling state interests to justify the sex-based classification and that the statute was narrowly
drawn to avoid unnecessary infringement on the applicant's constitutional rights.
On remand, the First Circuit Court of Hawaii ruled that the state did not have a compeiiing
interest in preventing same-sex couples from obtaining a marriage license. Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No.
91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, reprinted in 23 Fam. L. Rep. 2001 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996). For an
excellent account of the political and legal history to this point, see Coolidge, supra note I.
For a detailed account of the continuing litigation, see David Orgon Coolidge, in this
symposium.
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rificed," 32 the plaintiffs nonetheless succeeded in convincing a plurality of
the Hawaii Supreme Court that the prohibition against same-sex marriage
was "an example of sex discrimination" 33 under the Hawaii state constitution.34 The reasoning of the plurality of the Hawaii Supreme Court relied
in part upon the characterization of marriage as essentially a legal partnership created by the state to recognize couple relationships. As Coolidge
notes: "[t]he practical effect of the plurality opinion is to define marriage
wording to the view of two parties, rather than the people .... [I]t is no
longer the people's choice. The 'evolving social order' is being defined
and enacted into law by these justices."35 The weakened definition of marriage simply could not resist the incessant claims of individuals who hoped
to obtain its personal benefits as a matter of constitutional right.
Not surprisingly then, three years later in 1996 the federal court of appeal in Shahar v. Bowers36 concluded somewhat ambiguously that the constitutionally protected right of intimate association includes a lesbian relationship with contours similar to marriage as currently defined in judicial
opinions: "[t]hough the religious-based marriage 37 in which Shahar participated was not marriage in a civil, legal sense it was intimate and highly
personal in the sense of affection, commitment, and permanency and, as
we have spelled out, it was inextricably entwined with Shahar' s exercise of
her religious beliefs."38 The opinion has been vacated, and reversed by an

32. 852 P.2d at 57.
33. Coolidge, supra note I, at 19.
34. The Hawaii Constitution states: "No person shall ... be denied the equal protection of
the laws. nor be denied the enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the
exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex, or ancestry." HAW. CONST., art. I, § 5 (1978).
35. Coolidge, supra note I. at 27.
36. 70 F.3d 1218 (lith Cir. 1995).
37. "What Shahar claims is that she proposed to-and did-engage in a Jewish religious
ceremony that is recognized as a marriage ceremony by the branch of Judaism [Reconstructionist
Movement] to which she adheres; that this conferred upon her and her partner a religious-based
status that is apart from and independent of civil marriage as provided by Georgia law .... " /d.
at 1222.
38. 70 F.3d 1218, 1225 (11th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).
Judge Kravitch, concurring in part and dissenting in part, reviewed the jurisprudence recognizing
a constitutionally protected right to intimate association:
Intimate associations involve 'choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate
human relationship' .... In Roberts, the Supreme Court enumerated several characteristics typical of relationships entitled to constitutional protection as intimate associations:
'relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the
affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship.' Family
relationships, which by their nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to the
necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life,
'exemplify' -but do not exhaust-this category of protected associations .... Kenneth
L. Karst, "The Freedom of Intimate Association," 89 Yale L. J. 624, 629-37 (1980)
(defining intimate associations as 'a close and familiar personal relationship with another
that is in some significant way COMPARABLE to a marriage or family relationship')
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en bane panel, and certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme
Court. Without deciding whether the plaintiff had a constitutional right to
intimate association, the majority opinion contained the following statement: "Given the culture and traditions of the nation, considerable doubt
exists that Plaintiff has a constitutionally protected right to be 'married' to
another woman." The question, of course is whether the courts are correct
in articulating the current social conception of "marriage." 39
III.

REACTION OF WE "THE PEOPLE" THROUGH FEDERAL AND STATE
LEGISLATION

As David Coolidge has observed the traditional model of marriage has
retained a strong hold on the American cultural and legal imagination. 40
Thus, the reaction of we "The People" has generally been similar to the
response contained in We Hold These Truths: A Statement of Christian
Conscience and Citizenship, signed by numerous American religious leaders and moral commentators: "[ w]e are confronted by a radical redefinition

(emphasis added). A relationship that fits these descriptions is no less entitled to
constitutional protection just because it is between individuals of the same sex .
. . . Even if Shahar and Greenfield were not religious, I would still find that their
relationship involves the type of PERSONAL BOND that characterizes a First Amendment
intimate association .... Where intimacy and personal identity are so closely intertwined
as in the relationship between Shahar and Greenfield, the core values of the intimate
association right are at stake.
/d. at 1128, 29 (emphasis added).

Obviously, Judge Kravitch, with the help of a 1980 Yale Law Journal article, draws the
comparison between marriage and the relationship involved in Shahar v. Bowers, the defining
characteristic of which is personal bond.
39. 78 F.3d 499 (lith Cir. 1996). For an extensive discussion of the Shahar case, see
Cornelia Sage Russess, Shahar v. Bowers: Intimate Association and the First Amendment, 45 EMORY
L. J. 1481 (1996). Rev'd. 114 F.3d 499 (lith Cir. !997)(en bane), cert. denied, __ U.S. __ (No.
97-751, Jan. 21, 1998).
The Court declined to decide whether Plaintiff had a constitutional right to intimate association,
stating:
So, today we do stop short of making a final decision about such claimed rights. Instead,
we assume (for the sake of argument only) that Plaintiff has these rights; but we conclude
that the Attorney General's act -as an employer- was still lawful.
/d.

In regard to the issue of Plaintiffs being "married to another woman," Judge Godlold reasons
that marriage is a word with no necessary meaning:

In a common law/statutory/traditional sense "marriage" describes a ceremony as a
relationship or status between two persons as defined by common law or statute, involving
two heterosexual persons, one male and one female. But as this case tells us, that is not
the only and ineluctable meaning."
Id. at 1121.
40. Coolidge, supra note I, at 33.
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of marriage as courts declare marriage to be not a covenanted commitment
ordered to the great goods of spousal unity and procreation but a mere contract between autonomous individuals for whatever ends they happened to
seek."41
The immediate and overwhelming response of we "The People" 42
through our representatives at both the federal and state level has been to
make clear our understanding of the uniqueness of marriage as inherently
designed for the sexual complementarity between a man and a woman. 43
Even the Hawaii Legislature in 1994 expressly found that "heterosexuality
is intrinsic to marriage because the institution of marriage is 'intended to
foster and protect the propagation of the human race.' "44 The Defense of
Marriage Act passed by Congress defines marriage as "only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife."45 Likewise, the
legislative responses to the Baehr decision in twenty-nine states46 and

41. In FIRST THINGS, Oct. 1997, at 51, 53.
42. See Comment, The Defense of Marriage Act: The Latest Maneuver in the Continuing
Battle to Legalize Same-Sex Marriage, 34 Hous. L. REV. 425, 429 n. 25 (1997).
43. See infra notes 46-50.
44. Richard F. Duncan, Homosexual Marriage and the Myth of Tolerance, IO NOTRE DAME
J. LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY 587, 595 n.40 (1996) (quoting from Act of June 22, 1994, No.
217), reprinted in 20 FAM. L. REP. 2013, 2015 (1994).
One of the best accounts of the litigation and arguments before the court appears in Coolidge,
supra note I. His latest article, which appears in this symposium, recounts political events as well
as litigation tactics after the 1993 decision in Baehr. See Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card: SameSex Marriage and the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYU J. PuB. L. 201 (1998).
45. I USC § 7 (Supp. 1996). The section Act defines "marriage" and "spouses" as follows:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the
word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband
and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife.

/d.
Another section of the Act, 28 USC § 1738 (C) provides:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State,
territory. possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex
that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or
tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
46. ALA. EXEC. ORDER No. 24 (Aug. 30, 1996); ALASKA STAT.§ 25.05.011 (Michie 1996);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 25-101 ( Supp. 1997); ARK. CODE ANN.§ 9-11-109 (Michie Supp. 1997); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit 13, § 101 (Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (West Supp. 1998); GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (Supp. 1997); HAW. REV. STAT.§ 572-1 (Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE ANN §32-209
(Michie 1996); ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212 (West Supp. 1997); IND. CODE §31-11-l-l (Michie 1997);
KAN STAT. ANN §23-101 (1995); LA CIV. CODE ANN. art 86, 89 (West Supp. 1997); !9A ME. REV.
STAT. ANN.§ 701; MI. COMP. LAWS§ 551.1 (West Supp. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN.§ 93-1-1 (Supp.
1997); Mo. REV. STAT.§ 451.002 (1997); MoNT. CODE ANN.§ 40-1-401 (1997); N.C. GEN STAT.
§51-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 14-03-01 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (Anderson
1998); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 3.1 (West Supp. 1998); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.§ 1102 (Supp. 1997); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (West Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIAED LAws§ 25-1-1 (Michie Supp. 1997); TENN
CODE ANN.§ 36-3-113 (1996); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 30-J ..2 (1995); VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-45.2
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pending legislation in another twelve states47 reconfirm "The People['s]"
conception of marriage as an institution defined by sexual complementarity. When four other states are included because of statutory,48 judicial,49
or doctrinal 5° definitions of marriage as a relationship between a man and a
woman prior to the Baehr decision, the overwhelming response of "The
People" affirms the traditional model of marriage as between a man and a
woman.
IV. THE RESPONSIBILITY WE "THE PEOPLE" BEAR AND A POTENTIAL
CURE: LOUISIANA'S COVENANT MARRIAGE LAW

As mentioned previously, we "The People" bear some responsibility
for the diminished stature of marriage. We have permitted an increasing
dissonance between the marriage of our cultural imagination and the marriage we "The People" have endorsed, or at the least, come to accept: 51

(Michie Supp. 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.001 (1993). The majority of these citations appear in
Coolidge, supra note 1, at Appendix A.
47. S. 282, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1997); S. 535, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1997);
H.R. 382, 77th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (Iowa 1997); H.R. 398, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1997); H.R.
1725, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1997); H.R. 421, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 1997); S.J.R. 8,
43rd Leg, 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 1997); S. 577, 69th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1997); H.R. 3464, 75th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997); H.R. 182, 64th Leg., Biennial Sess. (Vt. 1997); H.R. 2865, 73rd Leg.
(W Va. 1997); H.R. 94, 54th Leg. (Wyo. 1997).
48. CAL. PAM. CODE. § 30l(West 1992).
49. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W. 2d 588 (Ky. 1973); M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super
Ct. App. Div. 1976), cert. denied, 364 A.2d 1076 (1976); Morris v. Morris, 31 Misc.2d 548, 220
NY.S.2d 590 (N.Y. 1961). Although not counted as a state, the District of Columbia case of Dean
v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (1995) defines marriage as between one man and one woman
interpreting D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-230, 30-101 (1981).
50. See N.Y DoM. REL. Ch. 14, art. 2, General Commentary (1988).
51. "[M]ost advocates of same-sex marriage fail to make the case for AIDS prevention
because they are generally careful not to make the case for marriage, but simply for the RIGHT to
marriage . . . Like the noted advocate Andrew Sullivan, Mr. Rotello assumes that same-sex
marriage would have to be marriage with infidelity loopholes built in. Moreover, settling down 'for
significant periods of time' is something less than a 'solid foundation' for the rearing of children.
ln this mimicry of marriage, however, the homosexual advocates may simply be reflecting the pattern
of a divorce-prone culture." Richard John Neuhaus, The Public Square, FIRST THINGS, (Nov. 1997),
at 78.
Richard John Neuhaus writes:
Here is a different take on the much discussed question of "same-sex marriage." Julie
Loesch Wiley writes: 'Some Christians say that gay marriage is impossible, but I would
strongly disagree. I would say that gay marriage is so typical for everybody in this
society-no matter what their sexual orientation-that it takes a heroic effort for any
couple to enter into anything but a "gay marriage.' " Her point is that what many people
mean by marriage today is something that homosexuals can undertake as well as anyone
else. Ms. Wiley writes, 'If you say that marriage need not be sexually exclusive, nor
irrevocable, nor devoted to child-rearing, nor a sacred sign of anything beyond the
participants' mutual self-interest-then you have taken away all its essential parts but,
obscurely, retained the same label.' The conclusion: 'From a Christian point of view it
is, of course, impossible for two men or for two women to join each other in holy
matrimony. But from a secular, civil point of view, it does make a kind of weird sense
that gays would want in on gay marriage. Because from a secular, civil point of view,
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marriage, the hallmark of which is personal autonomy, a commitment with
loopholes galore. 52 Far from that traditional model of marriage, we "The
People" first unceremoniously dumped the notion of permanent, or almost
permanent.

"The free terminability of marriage changes the definition of
marriage, just as there is an essential difference between a
contract terminable at will by either party and a contract terminable only after ten years. Such laws promote a certain
image of marriage, with terminability as one of its features." 53
In The Last Decade(s) of the American Family Law, Lee E. Teitelbaum
explains the shift in marriage policy that occurred from the 1950s to the
1990s:

Until the 1950s or 1960s, the connection between family stability and social welfare was taken for granted. The interests of
society were understood to require that spouses remain together except in cases of proven serious physical or mental
injury . . . . Current policy regarding marital dissolution is
fundamentally different . . . . [F]ormal policy no longer requires continuation of marriages that have become unsatisfactory to at least one of the spouses .... [C]urrent policy approves their termination . . . . The effect of this new
approach .... is to transfer authority for deciding on the duration of marriage from the law, which once sharply limited the
occasion for divorce, to individual spouses. 54
To recapture the meaning of marriage with all of its traditional elements, or even if we adopt the social pluralist model emphasizing marriage
as a "community,"55 we "The People" must restore the notion of the per-

that's the only kind of marriage there is.'

In the Public Square, FIRST THINGS, Dec. 1997, at 76.
52. Peter Kramer, Divorce and Our National Values, N.Y. TIMES, August 29, 1997, at A23
(Peter Kramer is clinical professor of psychiatry at Brown University).
53. Wolfe, supra note 23, at 37, 39. Wolfe continued:
[w]hat this makes clear is that liberal society is not neutral on the autonomous life (as
'autonomy' is conceived by contemporary liberals). Traditional communities-such as
groups of Catholics-within the larger political community that deny the absolute value
of the autonomous life are put at a distinct disadvantage, as things stand, by American
law. They are not permitted to make legally enforceable contracts binding themselves to
abide by what they take to be the moral law. From one perspective, one might say that
they are 'forced to be free.'
ld. at 39.
54. Lee E. Teitelbaum, The Last Decade(s) of American Family Law, 46 J. LEGAL ED. 546,
547-48 (Dec. 1996).
55. In his article Same-Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miike and the Meaning of Marriage, 38 S.
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manence of marriage. By restoring the notion of permanency, we assure
that the man and woman who marry make "total commitments, give fully
of themselves, [and] nourish intimacy .... "56 It is not enough to simply
add to the definition of marriage, "intended for life."57 When Steve Forbes
writes, "Reinforce the concept that marriage is a legally binding
contract .... ,'' 58 surely his view reflects the fact that the concern over the
impermanence of marriage has reached our collective conscience.
Citizens of the State of Louisiana have begun the process of restoring
more permanence to marriage with the enactment of "Covenant Marriage"59 legislation that took effect on August 15, 1997. The legislation
permits spouses to choose a more binding, more permanent marriage60 by

TEX. L. REV. 1, 52 (1997), David Orgon Coolidge proposes a "transmodem" model of marriage
consistent with the social pluralist view of marriage that incorporates the following dimensions, "but
fran1es them in the context of total sexual community . . . . The four central elements of marriage
as a total sexual community might be described as follows:
Consummation: a bodily union which is open to life (structural dimension);
Companionship: a relationship of mutuality (the social dimension);
Consent: a choice to marry a particular individual (the subjective dimension);
Covenant: a vow of total commitment (the spiritual dimension).
Understood this way, entering into marriage is a moral act that embodies substantive premises.
Coolidge, supra note 1, at 52.
From these dimensions, Coolidge derives the following principles for the governance of the
community of marriage by the most basic institution, marriage:
Marriage should be male-female (structural);
Marriage should be monogamous (social);
Marriage should be exclusive (subjective);
Marriage should be permanent (spiritual).
!d. at 53.
56. !d.
57. This suggestion made by David Coolidge is an improvement over current definitions of
marriage, especially if coupled with required pre-marital counseling so that the couple knew what
society, the larger community, expected of their union. I believe that more is required. The larger
community through law needs to impose practical mechanisms to assure that the couple adheres to
the commitment that marriage is intended for life. Supra note 1, at 58.
58. Steve Forbes, The Moral Basis of a Free Society, PoL'Y REV., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 21,
28. Forbes continued, "[m]ost Americans still marry in places of worship, acknowledging the sacred
nature of the vows they make to one another. To them, of course, marriage is much more than a
legal contract, but it is certainly not LESS than one." /d.
59. 1997 La. Acts 1380.
60. On the issue of permanence in marriage Christopher Wolfe argued:
My contention, however, is that the law is not neutral. In treating marriage as a
contract revocable at the will of either party, the law adopts one of the competing views
of marriage. It does not permit people to really bind themselves to a permanent and
exclusive marriage, by reinforcing the personal commitment with the force of the law.
Wolfe, supra note 23, at 38.
Interestingly, "Covenant Marriage" may have come at an opportune moment in history. In an
essay in TIME MAGAZINE Lance Morrow writes:
But off in a range of the male psyche audible only to guys and dogs, there vibrated the
sneaking thought that the fugitive groom-however big a jerk, nay, slimeball-had made
good an escape that men, in the yet undomesticated zones of their hearts, always applaud.
Something in every man abhors a wedding. Not for nothing are such ceremonies
performed by authority-and-punishment figures in black-dergy, judges. And a~ a guy
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civil covenant61 and encourages the participation of the Church, 62 an institution which possesses moral authority and is uniquely qualified to help
preserve marriage. The Church, an institution of civil society or a "community,"63 participates in preserving marriage prior to its celebration through
mandatory pre-marital counseling about the purpose of marriage, its seriousness, and the engaged couple's intent that their marriage be lifelong. 64

contemplates the $125,000 trap, his premature hanging, with rosebuds flown in from
France, the something in that man's mind cheers a miracle of last-minute escape-even
if it is an ignominious miracle. Huck has lit out for the territory."
Goodbye, Miss Havisham, TIME, Dec. 8, 1997, at 114. See also DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS
AMERICA (1995).
61. 1997 LA. SESS. LAw SERV. 1380, 9:272 (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380) provides:
A. A covenant marriage is a marriage entered into by one male and one female who
understand and agree that the marriage between them is a lifelong relationship. Parties
to a covenant marriage have received counseling emphasizing the nature and purposes of
marriage and the responsibilities thereto. Only when there has been a complete and total
breach of the marital covenant commitment may the non-breaching party seek a
declaration that the marriage is no longer legally recognized.
B. A man and woman may contract a covenant marriage by declaring their intent to do
so on their application for a marriage license, as provided in R.S. 9:224(c), and executing
a declaration of intent to contract a covenant marriage, as provided in R.S. 9:273. The
application for a marriage license and the declaration of intent shall be filed with the
official who issues the marriage license.
62. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:273 A. (2)(a) (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380)
provdes:
An affidavit by the parties that they have received premarital counseling from a priest,
minister, rabbi, clerk of the Religious Society of Friends, any clergyman of any religious
sect, or a marriage counselor, which counseling shall include a discussion of the
seriousness of covenant marriage, communication of the fact that a covenant marriage is
a commitment for life, a discussion of the obligation to seek counseling in times of
marital difficulties, and a discussion of the exclusive grounds for legally terminating a
covenant marriage by divorce or by divorce after a judgment of separation from bed and
board.
Steve Forbes wrote: "The founders never intended the separation of church from state to become
a separation of religion from public and civic life." The Moral Basis of a Free Society, PoL'Y REV.,
Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 20, 28.
63. These mediating structures or "communities" that mediate between the individual and the
State or the market need nourishing and have long been the concern of communitarians generally,
such as Mary Ann Glendon of Harvard University Law School. The family is the first community
a human being knows so it is of ultimate importance. Coolidge, supra note I, at 46. See SEEDBEDS
OF CIVIC VIRTUE: SOURCES OF COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AND CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
(Mary Ann Glendon and David Blankenhorn eds., 1995) (hereinafter referred to as Seedbeds).
64. Coolidge, supra note I, at 46. Concerning the lifetime nature of marriage Christopher
Wolfe has written:
some people might want to have that unbreakable, legally enforceable bond for
themselves, on various grounds. It would provide very strong incentives for each person
to make his or her own initial decision to marry carefully and reassure each person about
the seriousness with which his or her perspective spouse makes that decision. It would
provide similar incentives for each of them to exert the maximum effort to make the
marriage work, and again, reassure each one that his or her spouse has the same
incentives. This could be viewed as one 'strategy' for maximizing the likelihood of a
successful marriage.
Wolfe, supra note 23, at 38.
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The content of the counseling purposefully is not specified beyond requiring only a discussion of the seriousness of marriage and the mutual intention of the spouses that the marriage be lifelong. To have been more specific concerning the content of the counseling would have been too intrusive into religion's appropriate role in encouraging and preserving marriage. The legislation sought cooperation and assistance, not coercion. 65
Furthermore, the legislation authorizes a secular alternative, permitting
those who eschew religion to nonetheless contract a Covenant Marriage. 66
The declaration of intent signed by the prospective spouses after the counseling restores integrity to the dedicating promise itself; for what we say
and mean shapes the nature and destiny of the marriage. 67 A Covenant

65. At least one Louisiana denomination failed to see the distinction. The Bishop Dan E.
Solomon of the Methodist Church in Louisiana issued the following statement on June 27, 1997, four
days after the Covenant Marriage legislation passed:
In contrast to other religious leaders in the state, Bishop Dan E. Solomon, the
highest ranking official in the Louisiana Conference of the United Methodist Church,
today announced he views Louisiana's covenant marriage license as defined in House Bill
No. 756, which offers Louisiana residents a second option to the existing marriage
license, as "unnecessary," "confusing" and "intrusive."
"The church's covenant marriage is sufficient for all seasons and circumstances of
marriage," Solomon stated at his office at the United Methodist Conference Headquarters
in downtown Baton Rouge. "For the state to develop a covenant marriage license utilizing
the language of the church's ceremony is to imply that persons will be more faithful to
their vows if the state so requires than if their religious faith so requires.
"Regardless of the type of license obtained, for Christians, the marriage covenant
entered into at the time of the marriage ceremony is the same for all person," he
continued. "There are no levels of commitment or range of choices for couples married
in a United Methodist ceremony; there is one ceremony, and thereby one covenant,
applicable to all. Thus, for United Methodists, the covenant marriage license is
redundant."
The Bishop explained, "covenant is the intent and purpose of the church's marriage
ceremony while the license is the state's authorization for persons to enter into a legally
binding relationship.
''The United Methodist marriage ceremony already is and always will be clearly
focused on a life-long commitment. The language of the ceremony includes, 'forsaking
all others,' and 'being faithful as long as you both shall live,' " Solomon said. "Also, the
Discipline of the United Methodist Church (the law of the church) requires United
Methodist clergy to engage in due counsel with the parties involved prior to marriage."
Release from Bishop Dan. E. Solomon, United Methodist Church in Louisiana (June 27, 1997) (on
file with author).
66. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:273 A. (2)(a) (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380)
provides:
An affidavit by the parties that they have received premarital counseling from a priest,
minister, rabbi, clerk of the Religious Society of Friends, any clergyman of any religious
sect, or a marriage counselor, which counseling shall include a discussion of the
seriousness of covenant marriage, communication of the fact that a covenant marriage is
a commitment for life, a discussion of the obligation to seek marital counseling in times
of marital difficulties, and a discussion of the exclusive grounds for legally terminating
a covenant marriage by divorce or by divorce after a judgment of separation from bed
and board.
67. See David Blankenhorn, I Do?, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 1997, at 14-15. David Blankenhorn
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Marriage effectively makes each spouse legally accountable for the promise he or she made.
Covenant Marriage did not originate as an idea unique to the state of
Louisiana. In 1990, Representative Daniel Webster of Florida introduced a
Covenant Marriage bill68 that was never acted upon by the Florida legislature. Professor Margaret Brinig used the term covenant to describe marriage in a book review she wrote. 69 Professor Amitai Etzioni suggested the
possibility of "super-vows" in an article he wrote in Time Magazine. 70 Professor Christopher Wolfe proposed the possibility of an even more binding

abhors modern American marriage vows because they reflect a "loving relationship" of undetermined
duration created of the couple, by the couple and for the couple. He makes the point in his article
that the marriage vow is deeply connected to the marriage relationship.
68. H.R. 1585, Reg. Sess (Fla. 1990) provides:
Covenant marriage.-There is created in the state a union between man and woman to
be known as 'covenant marriage.' In order to be eligible to enter into a covenant
marriage, each party shall make a declaration of intent to do so upon application for a
marriage license. The declaration of intent shall contain the following:
(I) Written permission of both parents of both parties, unless deceased at the time
of the application, or unless extraordinary circumstances render written permission
untenable.
(2) Presentation of proof that both parties have attended premarital counseling by a
clergyman or marriage counselor, which premarital counseling included a discussion of
the seriousness of covenant marriage.
(3) Signatures of both parties on notarized documents which state: 'I, ....... , do hereby
declare my intent to enter into Covenant Marriage. I do so with the full understanding
that a Covenant Marriage may not be dissolved except by reason of adultery. I have
attended premarital counseling in good faith and understand my responsibilities to the
marriage. I promise to seek counsel in times of trouble. I believe that I have chosen my
life-mate wisely and have disclosed to him or her all facts that may adversely affect his
or her decision to enter into this covenant with me.'
6131. Dissolution of covenant marriage. Notwithstanding any provision of this chapter
to the contrary, a covenant marriage may not be dissolved except by reason of adultery.
A divorce may be granted on grounds of adultery if the defendant has been guilty of
adultery, but if it appears that the adultery complained of was occasioned by collusion of
the parties with the intent to procure a divorce, or if it appears that both parties have
been guilty of adultery, a divorce shall not be granted.
69. Margaret F. Brinig, Status, Contract, and Covenant, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 74 (1994)
(reviewing MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY (1994)).
70. Amitai Etzioni, How to Make Marriage Matter, TIME, Sept. 6, 1993, at 76. The
Communitarian Network has now produced a booklet entitled 0PPORTUNING VIRTUE: THE LESSONS
TO BE LEARNED FROM LoUISIANA'S COVENANT MARRIAGE LAW: A COMMUNITARIAN REPORT (1997).
It was prepared by Amitai Etzioni and Peter Rubin. The publication consists essentially of William
Gals ton, Making Divorce Harder is Better, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1997, at C3; Amitai Etzioni,
Marriage With No Easy Outs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1997; Amitai Etzioni, Give Couples the Tools
to Make Marriage Last, USA TODAY, Nov. 18, 1996, at 25A; Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational DecisionMaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L.REV. 9 (1990). In the introduction to the publication,
the authors also refer to an article by Margaret Brinig and Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and
Opportunism, 23 J. LEGAL STUDIES 869 (1994).
See also William A. Galston, PROGRESSIVE FAMILY POLICY FOR THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY,
BUILDING THE BRIDGE 149, 156.
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Covenant Marriage: one that could not be dissolved for any reason, a position consistent with Christian doctrine. 71
The two practical mechanisms of "Covenant" Marriage that accomplish a MORE permanent union are (1) the agreement of the parties to take
all reasonable steps to preserve their marriage if difficulties arise, including marital counseling72 and (2) limited grounds for divorce. 73 The Cove-

71. Wolfe, supra notes 23, at 37-41. Concerning this Wolfe wrote:
The proposal is this: let us amend state marriage laws so as to make it possible for
a man and woman to choose freely to enter into an indissoluble marriage. Note: possible,
not mandatory .... As the current legal order stands, all American marriages can be
dissolved by divorce decrees.
. . . Yet some people might want to have that unbreakable, legally enforceable bond
for themselves, on various grounds. [see note 63 for his explanation of its benefits.] ...
This could be viewed as one 'strategy' for maximizing the likelihood of a successful
marriage. Liberal divorce law not only rejects this strategy as a general one for all
marriages-it rules it out even for those who would freely choose it.
!d. at 37, 38.
For the citation to Christian authority that divorce is impermissible, see Mark 10:2-12.
72. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:273 A (I) (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380)
provides:
A declaration of intent to contract a covenant marriage shall contain all of the following:
A recitation by the parties to the following effect:
'A COVENANT MARRIAGE'
We do solemnly declare that marriage is a covenant between a man and a woman who
agree to live together as husband and wife for so long as they both may live. We have
chosen each other carefully and disclosed to one another everything which could adversely
affect the decision to enter into this marriage. We have received premarital counseling on
the nature, purposes, and responsibilities of marriage. We have read the Covenant
Marriage Act, and we understand that a Covenant Marriage is for life. If we experience
marital difficulties, we commit ourselves to take all reasonable efforts to preserve our
marriage, including marital counseling.
With full knowledge of what this commitment means, we do hereby declare that our
marriage will be bound by Louisiana law on Covenant Marriages and we promise to love,
honor, and care for one another as husband and wife for the rest of our lives.
73. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:307 A. (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380)
provides:
Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary and subsequent to the parties obtaining
counseling, a spouse to a covenant marriage may obtain a judgment of divorce only upon
proof of any of the following:
(I) The other spouse has committed adultery.
(2) The other spouse has committed a felony and has been sentenced to death or
imprisonment at hard labor.
(3) The other spouse has abandoned the matrimonial domicile for a period of one
year and constantly refuses to return.
(4) The other spouse has physically or sexually abused the spouse seeking the divorce
or a child of one of the spouses.
(5) The spouses have been living separate and apart continuously without
reconciliation for a period of two years.
(6) (a) The spouses have been living separate and apart continuously without
reconciliation for a period of one year from the date the judgment of separation from bed
and board was signed.
(b) If there is a minor child or children of the marriage, the spouses have been
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nant Marriage legislation reinstitutes legal separation but only for Covenant Marriages74 and its availability is of particular importance to persons
whose religious beliefs prohibit divorce. 75 As originally introduced, House
Bill No. 756 which contained the Covenant Marriage legislation permitted
immediate divorce for only two reasons: adultery and abandonment for one
year. 76 A legal separation could be obtained only for physical or sexual

living separate and apart continuously without reconciliation for a period of one year and
six months from the date the judgment of separation from bed and board was signed;
however, if abuse of a child of the marriage or a child of one of the spouses is the basis
for which the judgment of separation from bed and board was obtained, then a judgment
of divorce may be obtained if the spouses have been living separate and apart
continuously without reconciliation for a period of one year from the date the judgment
of separation from bed and board was signed.
74. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:307 B. (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380)
provides:
Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary and subsequent to the parties obtaining
counseling, a spouse to a covenant marriage may obtain a judgment of separation from
bed and board only upon proof of any of the following:
(I) The other spouse has committed adultery.
(2) The other spouse has committed a felony and has been sentenced to death or
imprisonment at hard labor.
(3) The other spouse has abandoned the matrimonial domicile for a period of one
year and constantly refuses to return.
(4) The other spouse has physically or sexually abused the spouse seeking the divorce
or a child of one of the spouses.
(5) The spouses have been living separate and apart continuously without
reconciliation for a period of two years.
(6) On account of habitual intemperance of the other spouse, or excesses, cruel
treatment, or outrages of the other spouse, if such habitual intemperance, or such illtreatment is of such a nature as to render their living together insupportable.
75. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:309 A. (I) (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380, 4)
provides:
Separation from bed and board in a covenant marriage does not dissolve the bond of
matrimony, since the separated husband and wife are not at liberty to marry again; but
it puts an end to their conjugal cohabitation, and to the common concerns, which existed
between them.
(2) Spouses who are judicially separated from bed and board in a covenant marriage
shall retain that status until either reconciliation or divorce.
B. (I) The judgment of separation from bed and board carries with it the separation
of goods and effects and is retroactive to the date on which the original petition was filed
in the action in which the judgment is rendered.
76. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:307 A. (HR. 756, Reg. Sess. (La. 1997)) provided:
Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, a spouse to a covenant marriage may
obtain a judgment of divorce only upon proof of any of the following:
(I) The other spouse has committed adultery.
(2) The other spouse has abandoned the matrimonial domicile for one year and
constantly refuses to return.
(3) The spouses have been living separate and a part continuously without
reconciliation for a period of one year from the date the judgment of separation from
bed and board was signed; or if there is a minor child or children of the marriage,
the spouses have been living separate and apart continuously without reconciliation
for one year and six months from the date the judgment of separation from bed and
board was signed.
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abuse of a spouse or a child of one of the spouses. 77 Obviously, the bill
was amended significantly during the legislative process resulting in six
grounds for divorce78 and six grounds for legal separation. 79 Despite the
increase in number of grounds for legal separation and divorce, the nofault ground for divorce requires that the spouses live separate and apart
for two years, 80 rather than six months in the case of a standard marriage. 81
The more limited grounds for divorce in a Covenant Marriage represent
the first time in almost two hundred years that the general trend in the
United States, as well as most Western societies, to make divorce easier
has been reversed. 82 Furthermore, the legislation restores broader notions

77. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:3078. (HR. 756, Reg. Sess. (La. 1997)) provided:
Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, a spouse to a covenant marriage may
obtain a judgment of separation from bed and board only upon proof that either:
(l) The other spouse has physically abused the spouse who is seeking a separation
from bed and board.
(2) The other spouse has physically or sexually abused a child of the marriage or a
child of one of the spouses.
78. These six grounds are adultery, commission of a felony and a sentence to death or
imprisonment at hard labor, abandonment for one year, physical or sexual abuse of the plaintiff
spouse or a child of the spouses, living separate and apart for two years, or living separate and apart
for one year or one year and six months after the judgment of separation from bed and board. 1997
La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:307 A. (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380, 4). See supra note 73
for the text.
79. These six grounds are: adultery, commission of a felony and a sentence to death or
imprisonment at hard labor, abandonment for one year, physical or sexual abuse of the plaintiff
spouse or a child of the spouses, living separate and apart for two years, or habitual intemperance,
excesses, cruel treatment, or outrages of the other spouse. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380 9:307
B. (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380, 4). See supra note 74 for text (emphasis added).
80. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:307 A. (5) (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380, 4).
See supra note 73 for text.
81. LA. Civ. CODE art. 102 (as amended by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380, I) provides:
Except in the case of a covenant marriage, a divorce shall be granted upon motion of a
spouse when either spouse has filed a petition for divorce and upon proof that one
hundred eighty days have elapsed from the service of the petition, or from the execution
of written waiver of the service, and that the spouses have lived separate and apart
continuously for at least one hundred eighty days prior to the filing of the rule to show
cause.
(emphasis added).
LA. Civ. CODE art. 103 (as amended by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380, I) provides that [e]xcept
in the case of a covenant marriage, a divorce shall be granted on the petition of a spouse upon
proof that:
"(l) The spouses have been living separate and apart continuously for a period of six months
or more on the date the petition is filed .... " (emphasis added).
82. For a sampling of proposals to address the increasingly disturbing prevalence of divorce,
see, e.g., MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE ABOLITION OF MARRIAGE: How WE DESTROY LASTING LoVE
{1996); BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE {1997); DAVID BLANKENHORN,
FATHERLESS AMERICA {1995); MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAw
(1987); Allen M. Parkman, Reform of the Divorce Provisions of the Marriage Contract, 8 BYU J.
PuB. L. 91 (1993); Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L.
REV. 79; Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV.
9 (1990); Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization,
Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 45 (1981).
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of objective morality to the relationship of marriage; 83 for example, for the
first time under Louisiana law, but only in a Covenant Marriage, domestic
violence is a ground for divorce. 84
Had the Covenant Marriage legislation not miraculously passed, the
author could have further refined the legislation to: (1) make abundantly
clear that the pre-divorce counseling agreed to by the couple emphasize
reconciliation and preserving the marriage, rather than counseling or therapy concerned only with the individual adult; 85 and (2) sever the explanation of the different grounds for divorce in a Covenant Marriage as compared to a standard marriage from the pre-marital counseling so that denominations86 concerned with the teaching of the Church about indissolu-

See, also, Maggie Gallagher & Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, End No-Fault Divorce?, First Things,
Aug.-Sept. 1997, at 24.
83. Of course, there is fierce opposition from members of the legal profession, practitioners
and academics, to a restoration of objective morality to the relationship of marriage. See, e.g., Ira
E11man and Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic Violence, and Other Bad Arguments
for Fault Divorce, 1997 ILL. L.REv. 719; J. Thomas Oldham, ALI Principles of Family Dissolution:
Some Comments, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 801, 818-820 (1997); DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS
(Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1991). See also Gallagher & Whitehead, supra note
82.
Nonetheless, it must be emphasized that a Covenant Marriage is the choice of the couple. The
fact that it is a choice is not of comfort to those who oppose restoration of objective fault to the
marital relationship or to those who oppose making divorce more difficult. Christopher Wolfe
summarizes the arguments by liberals opposing the choice of a more binding marriage contract as
follows:
[S]ocial liberals have a great deal of difficulty accepting restrictions on divorce, because
those who suffer from such restrictions are immediately and easily observable, while the
benefits of such restrictions (because they flow from indirect effects on incentives) are
not as easily identifiable. The common element underlying the two views is
misplaced-because it is based on excessively short-term views--<:ompassion.
Wolfe, supra note 23, at 39.
84. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:307 A(4) (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380, 4)
requires that "[t]he other spouse has physically or sexually abused the spouse seeking the divorce
or a child of one of the spouses."
A spouse in a Covenant Marriage may also obtain a separation from bed and board for the same
reason. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:307 B(4) (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380, 4).
85. William J. Doherty, How Therapists Threaten Marriages, THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY,
Summer 1997, at 31; Peter Kramer, Divorce and Our National Values, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 29, 1997,
at A23.
86. The Catholic Bishops of Louisiana issued the following Pastoral Statement on October 29,
1997:

The Legislature and the citizens of the State of Louisiana have manifested a
commendable concern for the permanence and stability of marriage by enacting the
Covenant Marriage Act. Strong and stable marriages are crucial for children and a healthy
society.
The Church's understanding of covenant is a broader and deeper reality moving
beyond the meaning contained in this new legislation. The Catholic Church considers a
marriage validly entered into to be permanent and, if between Christians, a sacrament. As
such, the Church requires significantly more than the State in preparation for and the
living of a marriage.
The Catholic Dioceses of Louisiana will continue to offer the marriage preparation
programs and teaching on the understanding of marriage to those who present themselves
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bility of marriage87 can fully embrace the concept without compromising

for marriage in the Church. The Louisiana Catholic Dioceses, over the last twenty years,
have developed a common policy requiring premarital preparation and counselling.
Because there are elements in this particular Covenant Marriage Act which require
those preparing couples for marriage to offer instruction on divorce contrary to the
Church's teaching, Catholic ministers preparing couples for marriage will concentrate their
focus on the Church's responsibility and teaching. The task to offer guidance with regard
to the specifics of the Covenant Marriage Act will then be left to those who render this
service in the name of the State. It would be inappropriate for those ministering to
couples preparing for marriage in the Catholic Church to confuse or obscure the integrity
of the Church's teaching and discipline by also providing this service, contradictory to
Church teaching and mandated by this state law.
For these reasons, the Catholic Bishops of the State of Louisiana will ask our
parishes to focus on the marriage preparation proper to the Church, support the aims of
the Covenant Marriage Act but relegate to state sanctioned counsellors the role of
handling the state required preparation for those who choose to use the Covenant
Marriage license.
Diocesan Procedures for Marriage Preparation
I. Catholic clergy are to accept either the standard or the covenant civil marriage
license for the celebration of weddings. It should be noted that should a couple seeking
marriage in the Catholic Church choose the non-covenant marriage license, this, according
to the teaching of Christ and His Church, can in no way be interpreted as diminishing
their total commitment to a permanent union.
2. The Catholic policy of marriage preparation is not changed. Catholic ministers*
are to continue the marriage preparation program currently being used. Regardless of the
choice of civil marriage license, couples are to participate in the usual Catholic marriage
preparation.
3. If a couple wishes to obtain a civil covenant marriage license, it will be necessary
for the couple to approach a marriage counsellor acceptable to the State to fulfill the state
regulations for this marriage license, namely, one who can instruct them about the divorce
laws of the State and sign the affidavit that this has been done. Catholic ministers may
not give pre-marital instructions on divorce laws and therefore may not sign such an
affidavit. Catholic ministers should not refer a couple to specific individual marriage
counselors in order to preserve the distinction between these two roles and to avoid
potential legal entanglements.
*The term "Catholic ministers" in these norms includes all clergy and any persons
offering pre-marital instruction in the name of the Church.
The Catholic Bishops are continuing discussion of the legislation on Covenant Marriage for the
purpose of considering curative legislation. Their first meeting was held on November 25, 1997,
without definitive action. The next legislative session during which amendments could be offered to
sever the divorce information from the pre-marital counseling would be 1999.
87. Mark I 0:2-12:
The Pharisees came and asked Him, 'is it lawful for a man to divorce his wife?' testing
Him. And He answered and said to them, 'What did Moses command you?' They said,
'Moses permitted a man to write a certificate of divorce, and to dismiss her.' And Jesus
answered and said to them, 'Because of the hardness of your heart he wrote you this
precept. But from the beginning of the creation, God "made them male and female." For
this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife. "And the
two shall become one flesh" so then they are no longer two, but one flesh. Therefore,
what God has joined together, let not man separate.' In the house His disciples also asked
Him again about the same matter. So He said to them, 'Whoever divorces his wife and
marries another commits adultery against her. And if a woman divorces her husband and
marries another, she commits adultery.'
Another alternative to severing the pre-marital counseling from information about divorce would
be to provide an alternative legislatively, a third option, that corresponds to the teaching of the
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the integrity of its pre-marital counseling. By virtue of the content of the
legislation, a Covenant Marriage requires that each heart be reached and
each couple convinced that marriage is an institution that is intended to be
lifelong for the ordering purpose of procreation. Without the unanimous
support of the leaders of all religious denominations 88 and with the legal

Church-a "Covenant Maniage" that is indissoluble. Christopher Wolfe makes just such a suggestion.
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
88. In addition to the Pastoral Statement by the Louisiana Catholic Bishops noted earlier, the
Louisiana Baptist Convention (Southern Baptist) passed the following resolution on November 17,
1997:
WHEREAS, In the regular session of the 1997 Louisiana Legislature, there was
passed what some have labeled the Covenant Maniage Act; and
WHEREAS, The so-called no-fault divorce laws in Louisiana and throughout the
United States, generally are considered by many to be a miserable failure; and
WHEREAS, There already exists misinformation and in some instances a lack of
information surrounding this issue; and
WHEREAS, Louisiana Baptists have historically supported the position that God's
Word clearly indicates that maniage originated in the mind of Almighty God and is
defined by Him as a commitment uniting a man and a woman into a holy relationship
meant to last a lifetime and not be broken except in limited circumstances; and
WHEREAS, the intent of the legislation is to strengthen the God given institution of
maniage and to move the legal standards for maniage and divorce closer to the standards
of the Word of God;
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the messengers of this !50th annual session
of the Louisiana Baptist Convention, meeting November 10-ll, 1997, in Alexandria,
Louisiana, encourage the Family Development Department of the Executive Board of the
Louisiana Baptist Convention to make materials available to pastors and churches
concerning Covenant Maniage; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That Associational Moral and Social Concerns
Committees be encouraged to ascertain the interest in hosting seminars addressing this
subject matter, and if interest is evident, invite the Louisiana Moral and Civic Foundation
to facilitate the seminars, using qualified and informed presenters in this area of the law,
along with local pastors or Bible teachers who can address this area of Biblical
instruction; and
BE IT FINAlLY RESOLVED, That we encourage pastors and churches to become
familiar with the law concerning Covenant Maniage and to use any tool available to
strengthen the institution of maniage among the people to whom we minister.
The Baptist Missionary Association of Louisiana unanimously adopted a similar resolution,
specifically encouraging its member churches and pastors "to marry those who choose the Covenant
Maniage as opposed to the Contract Maniage." Furthermore, other evangelical Protestant
denominations, such as the Assembly of God, Pentecostal Church, are very supportive of the
legislation.
Contrary to the position of the Baptists, the Bishop of the Methodist Church released a statement
on June 27, 1997, four days after the Covenant Maniage legislation passed essentially describing the
legislation as intrusive and redundant. See supra note 65 for text of the statement.
As reported in The Times-Picayune, Episcopal Bishop-Elect Charles Jenkins of Baton Rouge
criticized the law:
By bringing couples in covenant maniages back to a fault-based divorce system, with its
cynicism and occasional collusion for the sake of a divorce, 'It goes back to the bad old
days regarding divorce and dissolution of a household,' Jenkins said. 'We've been there;
it doesn't work. Those old ideas compromised the moral character of couples, they
compromised the integrity of judges, courts and attorneys.
Bruce Nolan, Bishops Back Off Covenant Marriage, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Thursday, Oct. 30, 1997, at
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and documentary requirements of the legislation, 89 someone has to educate
the individual ministers and secular marriage counselors who support Covenant Marriage about the process of pre-marital counseling and the execution of documents. Furthermore, citizens of the State need to be informed
and educated about the option of a Covenant Marriage 90 and why it is de-

AI.
According to the same article Jewish leaders already had signaled little support for the new civil
contract, but no official statement was ever issued or reported identifying the Jewish leaders. Id.
89. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:273 A. (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380, §3)
provides:
A declaration of intent to contract a covenant marriage shall contain all of the following:
(1) A recitation of the parties to the following effect . . . .
(2)(a) An affidavit by the parties that they have received premarital counseling from
a priest, minister, rabbi, clerk of the Religious Society of Friends, any clergyman of any
religious sect, or a marriage counselor, which counseling shall include a discussion of the
seriousness of covenant marriage, communication of the fact that a covenant marriage is
a conunitrnent for life, a discussion of the obligation to seek marital counseling in times
of marital difficulties, and a discussion of the exclusive grounds for legally terminating
a covenant marriage by divorce or by divorce after a judgment of separation from bed
and board.
(b) A notarized attestation, signed by the counselor and attached to or included in
the parties' affidavit, confrnning that the parties were counseled as to the nature and
purpose of the marriage and the grounds for termination thereof and acknowledging that
the counselor provided to the parties the informational pamphlet developed and
promulgated by the office of the attorney general, which pamphlet entitled the Covenant
Marriage Act, provides a full explanation of the terms and conditions of a covenant
marriage.
(3)(a) The signature of both parties witnessed by a notary.
(b) If one or both of the parties are minors, the written consent or authorization
of those persons required under the Children's Code to consent to or authorize the
marriage of minors.
B. The declaration shall contain two separate documents, the recitation and the
affidavit, the latter of which shall include the attestation either included therein or attached
thereto. The recitation shall be prepared in duplicate originals, one of which shall be
retained by the parties and the other, together with the affidavit and attestation, shall be
filed as provided in R.S. 9:272(B).
90. Legislators or individuals interested in Covenant Marriage legislation should enlist the
support of an existing organization or create such an organization to disseminate information about
Covenant Marriage, including not simply how to contract a Covenant Marriage but also why to
contract a Covenant Marriage. For it is not only engaged couples who may contract a Covenant
Marriage, "but also presently married couples:"
A. On or after August 15, 1997, married couples may execute a declaration of intent to
designate their marriage as a covenant marriage to be governed by the laws relative
thereto.
B. (1) This declaration of intent in the form and containing the contents required by
Subsection C of this Section must be presented to the officer who issued the couple's
marriage license and with whom the couple's marriage certificate is filed .... (provision if
couple married outside of Louisiana) The ofticer shall make a notation on the marriage
certificate of the declaration of intent of a covenant marriage and attach a copy of the
declaration to the certificate.

*****

C. (1) A declaration of intent to designate a marriage as a covenant marriage shall contain
all of the following:
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sirable in a more comprehensive manner than that provided by the Attorney General's pamphlet. 91
V. CONCLUSION
It is still too early to tell whether the "shrieking voices" of popular culture and high courts have changed once and for all the received meaning of

(a) A recitation by the parties to the following effect:
A COVENANT MARRIAGE
We do solemnly declare that marriage is a covenant between a man and a woman
who agree to live together as husband and wife for so long as they both may live. We
understand the nature, purpose, and responsibilities of marriage. We have read the
Covenant Marriage Act, and we understand that a Covenant Marriage is for life. If we
experience marital difficulties, we commit ourselves to take all reasonable efforts to
preserve our marriage, including marital counseling.
With full knowledge of what this commitment means, we do hereby declare that our
marriage will be bound by Louisiana law on Covenant Marriage, and we renew our
promise to love, honor, and care for one another as husband and wife for the rest of our
lives.'
(b )(i) An affidavit by the parties that they have discussed their intent to designate
their marriage a~ a covenant marriage with a priest, minister, rabbi, clerk of the Religious
Society of Friends, any clergyman of any religious sect, or a marriage counselor, which
included a discussion of the obligation to seek marital counseling in times of marital
difficulties and the exclusive grounds for legally terminating covenant marriage by divorce
or by divorce after a judgment of separation from bed and board.
(ii) A notarized attestation, signed by the counselor and attached to the parties'
affidavit, acknowledging that the counselor provided to the parties the information
pamphlet developed and promulgated by the office of the attorney general, which
pamphlet entitled the Covenant Marriage Act provides a full explanation of the terms and
conditions of a covenant marriage.
(iii) The signature of both parties witnessed by a notary.
(2) The declaration shall contain two separate documents, the recitation and the
affidavit, the latter of which shall include the attestation either included therein or attached
thereto. The recitation shall be prepared in duplicate originals, one of which shall be
retained by the parties and the other, together with the affidavit and attestation, shall be
filed as provided in Subsection B of this Section.
1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:275 A-C (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380, 3).
91. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380, 9:273 A. (2)(b) (as added by 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380,
§4) provides:
A notarized attestation, signed by the counselor and attached to or included in the parties'
affidavit, confmning that the parties were counseled as to the nature and purpose of the
marriage and the grounds for termination thereof and an acknowledging that the counselor
provided to the parties the informational pamphlet developed and promulgated by the
office of the attorney general, which pamphlet entitled the Covenant Marriage Act
provides a full explanation of the terms and conditions of a covenant marriage. See
Appendix B (emphasis added).
Section 5 of 1997 La. Acts, No. 1380, reads as follows:
The office of attorney general, Department of Justice shall, prior to August 15, 1997,
promulgate an informational pamphlet, entitled 'Covenant Marriage Act,' which shall
outline in sufficient detail the consequences of entering into a covenant marriage. The
informational pamphlet shall be made available to any counselor who provides marriage
counseling as provided for by this Act.
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the word marriage. It is still possible that we "The People," acting purposively through political agencies, will retrieve the traditional model of marriage and restore it whole within our cultural imagination. Louisianans, at
least, can no longer ignore the dissonance between the marriage of our cultural imagination and marriage as it actually exists; they have a choice. It
may be that, as Dr. Peter Kramer, clinical professor of psychiatry at Brown
University, opines: "contrary to claims on behalf of Louisiana's Covenant
Marriage, it is out of touch with our traditional values: self-expression,
self-fulfillment, self-rel;ance."92 As Christopher Wolfe has confirmed,
"[t]he ideal of autonomy, an autonomy so broad as to preclude fixed, permanent, lifelong commitments, is the foundation of our contemporary marriage laws. It is a substantive moral ideal."93
I hope Dr. Kramer is wrong, and I interpret Christopher Wolfe's statement as a "call to arms."94 How can personal autonomy be a moral ideal? I,
for one, cannot defend those values or that moral ideal to the children of

92. Peter Kramer. Divorce and Our National Values, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1997, at A23.
93. Wolfe, supra note 23, at 41.
94. Wolfe stated:
And this moral ideal is incompatible with and hostile to the substantive moral ideal of
marital fidelity that is embraced by certain traditional communities that from one
perspective are 'within' the American community and from another perspective are not:
most notably, by Catholicism. This is why it is fair to say that there is a 'culture war'
going on in our society today and why contemporary liberalism's claim to be simply 'a
procedural republic' is indefensible.
/d. at 41; see also JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA
(1991); Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights Legislation, Public
Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 393 (1994).
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this country. 95 How do you respond to the child whose parents divorced
twenty-five years ago when she comments:
I don't remember anything, except I remember living together
and then not. I don't remember anybody explaining anything
to me .... I didn't have anyone as support .... I spent so
much time alone that I tried to become my own support. But,
how do you do that as a child? I would go for days without saying a word. 96
Likewise, "[t]he day of the divorce my childhood ended."97
Midge Deeter summarized the dilemma posed by impermanent marriages and "too much divorce" in her review of Barbara Dafoe Whitehead's book, The Divorce Culture. She stated, "[i]n short, there is no
merely social cure for what ails us. But Barbara Dafoe Whitehead has at

95. See Katherine Spaht, Symposium, Would Louisiana's 'Covenant Marriage' Be a Good
Idea for America? Yes: Stop Sacrificing America's Children on the Cold Altar of Convenience for
Divorcing Spouses, INSIGHT MAGAZINE, Oct. 6-13, 1997 at 24-27. In this respect consider the
following:
If, as Professor Kramer wrote in the New York Times, 'an increase in divorce signals
social progress,' how do we explain to the children of divorce that 'social progress' is
defined without considering their welfare? Are we willing to look each one of those
children in the eye and respond to them as Kramer would that their parents' willingness
to stay together would have been ... out of touch with [Americans'] traditional values:
self-expression, self-fulfillment, self-reliance? Should we shrug our shoulders and say, as
he suggests, 'that the divorce rate reflects our national values with great exactness, and
that conventional modern marriage-an eternal commitment with loopholes
galore-expresses precisely the degree of loss of autonomy that we are able to tolerate'
regardless of its effect on children?
/d. In the same vein Joseph F. Coates observes:
A high divorce rate, however, can be viewed as a positive social indicator. It
represents an unequivocal rejection of a bad marriage. For the first time in any mass
society, Americans in the late twentieth century have had the wealth, prosperity, freedom,
and knowledge to reject a relationship that promised life-long misery and search for a
better one. The evidence is clear that the quest is not simply to escape a bad marriage
because a majority of divorced people either remarry or would remarry were the
opportunity available.
Among the emerging patterns are a divorce rate that has plateaued at about 20 per
1000; a widespread and ongoing commitment to marriage; and the advent of serial
marriages.
What's Ahead for the Family, FAMILY ADVOCATE, Spring, 1997, at 19.
For such an observation to appear in a publication entitled Family Advocate suggests the title
of the publication needs to be changed. It is a publication of the Family Law Section of the
American Bar Association-the group in society who profit from the ease in the breakup of families.
As a group, lawyers who practice in the family law area oppose any increased restrictions on divorce.
The reasons should be obvious.
96. Judith Wallerstein & Julia Lewis, The Long-Term Impact of Divorce on Children: A First
Report from a 25-Year Study (presented at the Second World Congress of Family Law and the
Rights of Children and Youth, June 6, 1997 in San Francisco, California) (part of a forthcoming
work in progress). See JUDITH WALLERSTEIN AND SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN,
WOMEN AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE (1990); GLENN T. STANTON, WHY MARRIAGE
MATTERS: REASONS TO BELIEVE IN MARRIAGE IN POSTMODERN SOCIETY (1997); Glenn T. Stanton,
The Children of Divorce, THE WORLD & I, Oct. 1997, at 54.
97. Wallerstein and Lewis, supra note 96.
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least helped us to stop kidding ourselves about one aspect of our lives, and
that is a help. The rest-who knows?-may require the power of God himself. " 98 Or, it may require law that gives a couple the choice to make a
binding civil commitment to a more permanent married life together, more
nearly in accord with God's plan.

98. Richard John Neuhaus, The Public Square:, While They're At It,
1997, at 81.

FIRST THINGS,

Aug.-Sept.
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APPENDIX A
DECLARATION OF INTENT TO CONTRACT
A COVENANT MARRIAGE
"A COVENANT MARRIAGE"
We do solemnly declare that marriage is a covenant between a man
and a woman who agree to live together as husband and wife for so long as
they both may live. We have chosen each other carefully and disclosed to
one another everything which could adversely affect the decision to enter
this marriage. We have received premarital counseling on the nature, purposes, and responsibilities of marriage. We have read the Covenant Marriage Act, and we understand that a Covenant Marriage is for life. If we
experience marital difficulties, we commit ourselves to take all reasonable
efforts to preserve our marriage, including marital counseling.
With full knowledge of what this commitment means, we do hereby
declare that our marriage will be bound by Louisiana law on Covenant
Marriages and we promise to love, honor and care for one another as husband and wife for the rest of our lives.

Signature of Covenanting Parties
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STATE OF LOUISIANA
PARISH OF
BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public, personally came and
appeared:

(Insert names of prospective spouses)
who after being duly sworn by me, Notary, deposed and stated that:
Affiants acknowledge that they have received premarital counseling
from a priest, minister, rabbi, clerk of the Religious Society of Friends, any
clergyman of any religious sect, or a marriage counselor, which marriage
counseling included:
a discussion of the seriousness of Covenant Marriage,
communication of the fact that a Covenant Marriage is a commitment for life,
a discussion of the obligation to seek marital counseling in times
of marital difficulties,
a discussion of the exclusive grounds for legally terminating a
Covenant Marriage by divorce or by divorce after a judgment of separation
from bed and board.
Furthermore Affiants sayeth not.

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED
BEFORE ME THIS _ __
DAY OF _ _ _ _ _ __
19_ _

NOTARY PUBLIC
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ATTESTATION

The undersigned does hereby attest that the affiants did receive counseling from me as to the nature and purpose of marriage and the grounds
for termination thereof, and did receive from me the information pamphlet
developed and promulgated by the office of the Attorney General, which
pamphlet entitled "Covenant Marriage Act" provides a full explanation of
the terms and conditions of a Covenant Marriage.

COUNSELOR

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED
BEFORE ME THIS _ __
DAY O F - - - - - - 19_ _

NOTARY PUBLIC
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APPENDIXB
COVENANT MARRIAGE ACT PAMPHLET99
COVENANT
MARRIAGE ACT
CONTRACTING A
COVENANT MARRIAGE

The couple who chooses to enter into a "Covenant Marriage"
agrees to be bound by two serious limitations on obtaining a
divorce or a separation. These
limitations, that do not apply to
other couples married in Louisiana, are as follows:
The couple legally
agrees to seek marital
counseling if problems
develop during the
marriage;
and
The couple can only
seek a divorce or legal
separation for limited
reasons as explained
herein.

A marriage is an agreement to
live together as husband and
wife forever; the parties have
chosen each other carefully
and disclosed to each other
"everything which could adversely affect" the decision to
marry; the parties have received premarital counseling;
a commitment that if the parties experience marital difficulties they commit to take all
reasonable efforts to preserve
their marriage, including marital counseling; and the couple
must also obtain premarital
counseling from a priest,
rabbi, or similar clergyman of
any sect or a marriage counselor.
After discussing the meaning of
a Covenant Marriage with the
counselor, the couple must also
sign, together with an attestation
by the counselor, a notarized
affidavit to the effect that the
counselor has discussed with
them:

DECLARATION OF INTENT

In order to enter into a Covenant Marriage, the couple must
sign a recitation that provides:

the seriousness of a Covenant
Marriage;
the commitment to marriage
is for life;
the obligation of the couple to
seek marital counseling if

1. The following is a reproduction of the pamphlet. Any changes were made solely for the
purpose of clearer presentation.
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problems arise in the marriage; and
the exclusive grounds for divorce or legal separation.
The two documents which comprise the Declaration of Intent-the recitation and the
affidavit with attestation-must
be presented to the official who
issues the marriage license.
LEGAL SEPARATION IN A
COVENANT MARRIAGE
In order to obtain a legal separa-

tion (which is not a divorce and
therefore does not end the marriage), a spouse to a Covenant
Marriage must first obtain counseling and then must prove:

adultery by the other spouse;
commission of a felony by the
other spouse and a sentence of
imprisonment at hard labor or
death;
abandonment by the other
spouse for one year;
physical or sexual abuse of the
spouse or of a child of either
spouse;
the spouses have lived separate and apart for two years;
or
habitual intemperance (for
example, alcohol or drug
abuse), cruel treatment, or
severe ill treatment by the
other spouse.
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DIVORCE IN A COVENANT
MARRIAGE
A marriage that is not a Covenant Marriage may be ended by
divorce more easily than a Covenant Marriage. In a marriage
that is not a Covenant Marriage,
a spouse may get a divorce for
adultery by the other spouse,
conviction of a felony by the
other spouse and his imprisonment at hard labor or death; or
by proof that the spouses have
lived separate and apart for six
months before or after filing for
divorce.
In a Covenant Marriage a
spouse may ONLY get a divorce
after receiving counseling and
may ONLY get a divorce for the
following reasons:

adultery by the other spouse;
commission of a felony by the
other spouse and sentence of
imprisonment at hard labor or
death;
abandonment by the other
spouse for one year;
physical or sexual abuse of the
spouse of a child of either
spouse;
the spouses have lived separate and apart for two years;
or
the spouses are judicially or
legally separated and have
lived separate and apart since
the legal separation for:
(a) one year and six
months if there is a minor
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child or children of the
marriage
(b) one year if the separation was granted for abuse
of a child of either spouse;
(c) one year in all other
cases

A NOTE TO PRESENTLY
MARRIED COUPLES
Couples who are already married may execute a declaration
of intent to designate their marriage a Covenant Marriage.
They must sign a recitation and
an affidavit similar to those described in this pamphlet, after
receiving counseling. The counselor must attest to the counseling. This intent to designate
their marriage a Covenant Marriage must be filed with the official who issued their marriage
license and with whom the marriage certificate of the couple is
filed.
If the couple was married outside of Louisiana, a copy of
their marriage certificate, with
the declaration of intent, shall
be filed with the officer who
issues marriage licenses in the
parish of the couple's domicile.
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